What Will Bitcoin Difficulty Adjustment Mean For BTC Prices?
What Will Bitcoin Difficulty Adjustment Mean For BTC Prices?
Bitcoin Difficulty and Hashrate Chart - BitcoinWisdom
Bitcoin difficulty will drop more than 10% in 2014 - BetMoose
Are Bitcoin Hash Rates and Difficulty Really Related to ...
$10: One Perspective On What Bitcoin Will Be Worth In 2014
Vertcoin Mining AMA
What is Vertcoin?
Vertcoin was created in 2014. It is a direct hedge against long term mining consensus centralization on the Bitcoin mining network. Vertcoin achieves its mining consensus solely through Graphics Cards as they are the most abundant / widely available consensus devices that produce a reasonable amount of hashrate. This is done using a mining algorithm that deliberately geared against devices like ASICs, FPGAs and CPUs (due to botnets) making them extremely inefficient. Consensus distribution over time is the most important aspect of a blockchain and should not be taken lightly. It is critical that you understand what blockchain specifications mean/do to fully understand Vertcoin.
When users of our network send each other Vertcoin, their transactions are secured by a process called mining. Miners will compose a so-called block out of the pending transactions, and need to perform a large number of computations called hashes in order to produce the Proof-of-Work. With this Proof-of-Work, the block is accepted by the network and the transactions in it become confirmed. Mining is essentially a race. Whoever finds a valid Proof-of-Work and gets the block propagated over more than half of the Vertcoin network first, wins this race and is allowed to reward themselves with the block reward. The block reward is how new Vertcoin come in circulation. This block reward started at 50 VTC when Vertcoin was launched, and halves every four years. The current block reward is 25 VTC. Vertcoin's One Click Miner: https://github.com/vertcoin-project/One-Click-Minereleases Learn more about mining here: https://vertcoin.org/mine/ Specification List: · Launch date: Jan 11, 2014 · Proof-Of-Work (Consensus Mechanism) · Total Supply: 84,000,000 Vertcoin · Preferred Consensus Device: GPU · Mining Algorithm: Lyra2REv3 (Made by Vertcoin) · Blocktime: 2.5 minutes · SegWit: Activated · Difficulty Adjustment Algorithm: Kimoto Gravity Well (Every Block) · Block Halving: 4 year interval · Initial Block Reward: 50 coins · Current Block Reward: 25 coin More spec information can be found here: https://vertcoin.org/specs-explained/
Why Does Vertcoin Use GPUs Then?
ASIC’s (Manufactuer Monopoly) If mining were just a spade sure, use the most powerful equipment which would be an ASIC. The problem is ASICs are not widely available, and just happen to be controlled by a monopoly in China. So, you want the most widely available tool that produces a fair amount of hashrate, which currently manifests itself as a Graphics Card. CPUs would be great too but unfortunately there are viruses that take over hundreds of thousands of computers called Botnets (they’re almost as bad as ASICs).
Mining In Pools
Because mining is a race, it’s difficult for an individual miner to acquire enough computational power to win this race solo. Therefore there’s a concept called pool-mining. With pool-mining, miners cooperate in finding the correct Proof-of-Work for the block, and share the block reward based on the work contributed. The amount of work contributed is measured in so-called shares. Finding the Proof-of-Work for a share is much easier than finding it for a block, and when the cooperating miners find the Proof-of-Work for the block, they distribute the reward based on the number of shares each miner found. Vertcoin always recommends using P2Pool to keep mining as decentralized as possible. How Do I Get Started? If you want to get started mining, check out the Mine Vertcoin page.
Vertcoin just forked to Lyra2REv3 and we are currently working on Verthash
Verthash is and was under development before we decided to hard fork to Lyra2REv3. While Verthash would’ve resulted in the same effect for ASICs (making them useless for mining Vertcoin), the timeline was incompatible with the desire to get rid of ASICs quickly. Verthash is still under development and tries to address the outsourcability problem. Verthash is an I/O bound algorithm that uses the blockchain data as input to the hashing algorithm. It therefore requires miners to have all the blockchain data available to them, which is currently about 4 GB of data. By making this mining data mandatory, it will become harder for auto profit switching miners — like the ones that rent out their GPU to Nicehash — because they will need to keep a full node running while mining other algorithms for the moment Verthash becomes more profitable — the data needs to be available immediately since updating it can take a while. Over the past month, we have successfully developed a first implementation of Verthash in the Vertcoin Core code base. Within the development team we have run a few nodes on Testnet to test the functionality — and everything seems to work properly. The next step is to build out the GPU miners for AMD and Nvidia. This is a NOETA at the moment, since we’re waiting on GPU developers which are in high demand. Once the miners are ready, we’ll be releasing the Vertcoin 0.15 beta that hardforks the testnet together with the miners for the community to have a testrun. Given the structural difference between Lyra2RE and Verthash, we’ll have to run the testnet for a longer period than we did with the Lyra2REv3 hard fork. We’ll have to make sure the system is reliable before hardforking our mainnet. So the timeline will be longer than with the Lyra2REv3 hard fork. Some people in the community have voiced concerns about the fact that Verthash development is not being done “out in the open”, i.e.: the code commits are not visible on Github. The main two reasons for us to keep our cards to our chest at this stage are: (1) only when the entire system including miners has been coded up can we be sure the system works, we don’t want to release preliminary stuff that doesn’t work or isn’t secure. Also (2) we don’t want to give hardware manufacturers or mining outsourcing platforms a head start on trying to defeat the mechanisms we’ve put in place.
How to get $100 million in VC funding to build an industry that makes $300 million profit without spending a dime
Yesterday I received an unexpected gift: a link to a copy of the slides of the presentation that 21inc gave to investors, apparently between October and December 2014, when they were still calling themselves "21E6". (The sender asked to remain anonymous, and I am not sure about the copyright status of the file; so I would rather not repost it here yet. But it seems that several other people, including some of the 21inc competitors, have got a copy too; so anyone who is really interested can probably get it too.) The slides don't have much new factual information, and basically confirm what we already guessed about the 21inc business plans. But they show that we severely underestimated their chutzpah and hype. Here are some random highlights (as far as I can decipher from the slides):
They had three relevant mining rig designs in the plans, that would require funding:
The "TH/s", "Cost", and "kW" columns are per "system", i.e. a mining unit containing many chips. The last column is the expected profit to be made from each set of mining hardware over its expected lifetime. (The slides have some other details that do not seem to be important.) The first line is the hardware that they were mining with at the time of the presentation; that must be why the "Cost" (as far as investors are concerned) is given as zero. The second line seems to be an upgrade of their previous mining hardware from v1 chips (which gave 2.7 PH/s total at the time) to v3 chips (which would give 17 PH/s) . In reality, we have seen that their share of hashpower dwindled through all of 2015, and (AFAIK) they haven't mined a single block in the last six months. Were they still mining with CyrusOne on extra-life, or were they using the upgraded IO which was turned off prematurely? What happened to Brownfield?
However, their mining operations were secondary; the meat of their plan was the embedded chip, called BitSplit at the time. The BitSPlit chip (as we suspected) was hard-wired to send 75% of the block reward to the 21inc wallet, whose address was burned in the silicon, and 25% to the user's wallet. By my calculations, assuming 50 GH/s and no increase in the difficulty, the BitSplit would mine one block in 570 years, on average, and collect less than 2 BTC of reward in that time. So, of course, the chip was hard-wired to mine into a pool run by 21inc, that would spread the user's 25% of those 2 BTC (expected) into a daily regular trickle of a couple thousand satoshis. Their own mining operations would provide the BTC needed for the pool payouts of all the millions of chips that they expected to be running out there. They projected to release 3 versions:
Model Qty GH/s W Cost Deploy Profit($) --------------- ---------- ---- -- ---- ------------ ------------ USB hub-charger 250,000 38 15 $35 Mar 2015 ~8,000,000 Embedded chip 1,000,000 63 15 $8 Aug 2015 ~103,000,000 BitSplit Inside 10,000,000 20 5 $0 Oct 2015 ~292,000,000
The "Qty" is the expected number of units sold. The last column, IIUC, is the profit that 21inc expected to make from the 75% cut of the BTC produced by all the chips, over their expected lifetime. In the above "USB hub-charger" model was a USB charging unit, roughly 3 x 2 x 1 inches, with 2 USB outputs and a mining chip inside, produced by 21inc themselves "to seed the market". The second line, which I called "Embedded chip", seems to refer to discrete BitSplit chips provided by 21inc and included in consumer devices (like routers etc.) by OEM manufacturers. The "BitSplit Inside" model would be the BitSplit integrated into the chipsets of other manufacturers, and manufactured by them. Its cost is listed as "$0" (for 21inc) because they expected those manufacturers to shoulder the cost of manufacturing and integrating the mining chip. Apparently the market-seeding "USB hub-charger" was later replaced by the "Bitcoin Computer" (aka the PiTato). In one slide it is called "multifunctional BitSplit device", and depicted as a sleek shiny black box, the size of a cigarette pack, with a power cable and 2-3 USB or similar outputs. If that is supposed to be the PiTato, presumably they had not yet realized that a 15 w computer would need a cooling fan with a miniature wind tunnel on top. In the last two entries, the manufacturers (not the device owners!) would be rewarded with the 25% slice of the BTC mined by those embedded chips. As an example, the slides say that a manufacturer who produced one quarter of the embedded BitSplits would get the 25% cut on the BTC yield of those chips, that was estimated to be between 2 and 4 million dollars per year of revenue in 2015--2018. Those numbers are based on the following predicted mean BTC prices: $350 for 2015, $1000 for 2016, $2200 for 2017, and $5500 for 2018.
Joint Statement on Broker-Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities
WASHINGTON – Market participants have raised questions concerning the application of the federal securities laws and the rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) to the potential intermediation—including custody—of digital asset securities1 and transactions. In this statement, the staffs of the Division of Trading and Markets (the “Division”) and FINRA (collectively, the “Staffs”)—drawing upon key principles from their historic approach to broker-dealer regulation and investor protection—have articulated various considerations relevant to many of these questions, particularly under the SEC’s Customer Protection Rule applicable to SEC-registered broker-dealers.2 As a threshold matter, it should be recognized by market participants that the application of the federal securities laws, FINRA rules and other bodies of laws to digital assets, digital asset securities and related innovative technologies raise novel and complex regulatory and compliance questions and challenges. For example, and as discussed in more detail below, the ability of a broker-dealer to comply with aspects of the Customer Protection Rule is greatly facilitated by established laws and practices regarding the loss or theft of a security, that may not be available or effective in the case of certain digital assets. The Staffs are aware of, and encourage and support, efforts to address these issues such that compliance with the Customer Protection Rule and other federal securities laws and FINRA rules is reasonably practicable. In recent months, the Staffs have been engaged with industry participants regarding how industry participants believe a particular custody solution for digital asset securities would meet the possession or control standards prescribed in the SEC’s Customer Protection Rule. The Staffs have found these discussions to be very informative and appreciate market participants’ ongoing engagement on these issues. The Staffs encourage and support innovation and look forward to continuing our dialogue as market participants work toward developing methodologies for establishing possession or control over customers’ digital asset securities. Contact information for Commission and FINRA staffs is provided at the end of this statement. Importance of the Customer Protection Rule Entities seeking to participate in the marketplace for digital asset securities must comply with the relevant securities laws.3 An entity that buys, sells, or otherwise transacts or is involved in effecting transactions in digital asset securities for customers or its own account is subject to the federal securities laws, and may be required to register with the Commission as a broker-dealer and become a member of and comply with the rules of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), which in most cases is FINRA. Importantly, if the entity is a broker-dealer, it must comply with broker-dealer financial responsibility rules,4 including, as applicable, custodial requirements under Rule 15c3-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), which is known as the Customer Protection Rule. The purpose of the Customer Protection Rule is to safeguard customer securities and funds held by a broker-dealer, to prevent investor loss or harm in the event of a broker-dealer’s failure, and to enhance the Commission’s ability to monitor and prevent unsound business practices. Put simply, the Customer Protection Rule requires broker-dealers to safeguard customer assets and to keep customer assets separate from the firm’s assets, thus increasing the likelihood that customers’ securities and cash can be returned to them in the event of the broker-dealer’s failure. The requirements of the Customer Protection Rule have produced a nearly fifty year track record5 of recovery for investors when their broker-dealers have failed. This record of protecting customer assets held in custody by broker-dealers stands in contrast to recent reports of cybertheft,6 and underscores the need to ensure broker-dealers’ robust protection of customer assets, including digital asset securities. Various unregistered entities that intend to engage in broker-dealer activities involving digital asset securities are seeking to register with the Commission and have submitted New Membership Applications (“NMAs”) to FINRA. Additionally, various entities that are already registered broker-dealers and FINRA members are seeking to expand their businesses to include digital asset securities services and activities. Under FINRA rules, a firm is prohibited from materially changing its business operations (e.g., engaging in material digital asset securities activities for the first time) without FINRA’s prior approval of a Continuing Membership Application (“CMA”).7 The NMAs and CMAs currently before FINRA are diverse: Some of the NMAs and CMAs cover proposed business models that would not involve the broker-dealer engaging in custody of digital asset securities. On the other hand, some NMAs and CMAs include the custodying of digital asset securities, and therefore implicate the Customer Protection Rule, among other requirements. Some of these entities have met with the Staffs to discuss how they propose to custody digital asset securities in order to comply with the broker-dealer financial responsibility rules. These discussions have been informative. The specific circumstances where a broker-dealer could custody digital asset securities in a manner that the Staffs believe would comply with the Customer Protection Rule remain under discussion, and the Staffs stand ready to continue to engage with entities pursuing this line of business. Noncustodial Broker-Dealer Models for Digital Asset Securities As noted, some entities contemplate engaging in broker-dealer activities involving digital asset securities that would not involve the broker-dealer engaging in custody functions. Generally speaking, noncustodial activities involving digital asset securities do not raise the same level of concern among the Staffs, provided that the relevant securities laws, SRO rules, and other legal and regulatory requirements are followed.8The following are examples of some of the business activities of this type that have been presented or described to the Staffs.
One example is where the broker-dealer sends the trade-matching details (e.g., identity of the parties, price, and quantity) to the buyer and issuer of a digital asset security—similar to a traditional private placement—and the issuer settles the transaction bilaterally between the buyer and issuer, away from the broker-dealer. In this case, the broker-dealer instructs the customer to pay the issuer directly and instructs the issuer to issue the digital asset security to the customer directly (e.g., the customer’s “digital wallet”).
A second example is where a broker-dealer facilitates “over-the counter” secondary market transactions in digital asset securities without taking custody of or exercising control over the digital asset securities. In this example, the buyer and seller complete the transaction directly and, therefore, the securities do not pass through the broker-dealer facilitating the transaction.
Another example is where a secondary market transaction involves a broker-dealer introducing a buyer to a seller of digital asset securities through a trading platform where the trade is settled directly between the buyer and seller. For instance, a broker-dealer that operates an alternative trading system (“ATS”) could match buyers and sellers of digital asset securities and the trades would either be settled directly between the buyer and seller, or the buyer and seller would give instructions to their respective custodians to settle the transactions.9 In either case, the ATS would not guarantee or otherwise have responsibility for settling the trades and would not at any time exercise any level of control over the digital asset securities being sold or the cash being used to make the purchase (e.g., the ATS would not place a temporary hold on the seller’s wallet or on the buyer’s cash to ensure the transaction is completed).
Considerations for Broker-Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities Whether a security is paper or digital, the same fundamental elements of the broker-dealer financial responsibility rules apply. The Staffs acknowledge that market participants wishing to custody digital asset securities may find it challenging to comply with the broker-dealer financial responsibility rules without putting in place significant technological enhancements and solutions unique to digital asset securities. As the market, infrastructure, and law applicable to digital asset securities continue to develop, the Staffs will continue their constructive engagement with market participants and to gather additional information so that they may better respond to developments in the market10while advancing the missions of our respective organizations: for the SEC, to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation; and for FINRA, to provide investor protection and promote market integrity. The Customer Protection Rule Overview A broker-dealer seeking to custody digital asset securities must comply with the Customer Protection Rule. As noted, the rule is designed principally to protect customers of a registered broker-dealer from losses and delays in accessing their securities and cash that can occur if the firm fails. The rule requires the broker-dealer to safeguard customer securities and cash entrusted to the firm, as discussed below. If the broker-dealer fails, customer securities and cash should be readily available to be returned to customers.11 In the event the broker-dealer were to be liquidated under SIPA, the SIPA trustee would be expected to step into the shoes of the broker-dealer and expected to be able to transfer, sell, or otherwise dispose of assets in accordance with SIPA.12 Among its core protections for customers, Rule 15c3-3 requires a broker-dealer to physically hold customers’ fully paid and excess margin securities or maintain them free of lien at a good control location.13 Generally, a broker-dealer may custody customer securities with a third-party custodian (e.g., the Depository Trust Company or a clearing bank),14 and uncertificated securities, such as mutual funds, may be held at the issuer or at the issuer’s transfer agent.15 In either case, there is a third party that controls the transfer of the securities. This traditional securities infrastructure (including, for example, related laws of property and security) also has processes to reverse or cancel mistaken or unauthorized transactions. Considerations for Digital Asset Securities There are many significant differences in the mechanics and risks associated with custodying traditional securities and digital asset securities. For instance, the manner in which digital asset securities are issued, held, and transferred may create greater risk that a broker-dealer maintaining custody of them could be victimized by fraud or theft, could lose a “private key” necessary to transfer a client’s digital asset securities, or could transfer a client’s digital asset securities to an unknown or unintended address without meaningful recourse to invalidate fraudulent transactions, recover or replace lost property, or correct errors. Consequently, a broker-dealer must consider how it can, in conformance with Rule 15c3-3, hold in possession or control digital asset securities. In particular, a broker-dealer may face challenges in determining that it, or its third-party custodian, maintains custody of digital asset securities.16 If, for example, the broker-dealer holds a private key, it may be able to transfer such securities reflected on the blockchain or distributed ledger. However, the fact that a broker-dealer (or its third party custodian) maintains the private key may not be sufficient evidence by itself that the broker-dealer has exclusive control of the digital asset security (e.g., it may not be able to demonstrate that no other party has a copy of the private key and could transfer the digital asset security without the broker-dealer’s consent).17 In addition, the fact that the broker-dealer (or custodian) holds the private key may not be sufficient to allow it to reverse or cancel mistaken or unauthorized transactions. These risks could cause securities customers to suffer losses, with corresponding liabilities for the broker-dealer, imperiling the firm, its customers, and other creditors. The Books and Records and Financial Reporting Rules Overview The broker-dealer recordkeeping and reporting rules18 require a broker-dealer, among other things, to make and keep current ledgers reflecting all assets and liabilities,19 as well as a securities record reflecting each security carried by the broker-dealer for its customers and all differences determined by the count of customer securities in the broker-dealer’s possession or control compared to the result of the count with the broker-dealer’s existing books and records.20 The financial responsibility rules also require that broker-dealers routinely prepare financial statements,21 including various supporting schedules particular to broker-dealers, such as Computation of Net Capital under Rule 15c3-1 and Information Relating to the Possession or Control Requirements under Rule 15c3-3 under the Exchange Act.22 The books, records, and financial reporting requirements are designed to ensure that a broker-dealer makes and maintains certain business records to assist the firm in accounting for its activities. These rules also assist securities regulators in examining for compliance with the federal securities laws and as such are an integral part of the financial responsibility program for broker-dealers. Considerations for Digital Asset Securities The nature of distributed ledger technology, as well as the characteristics associated with digital asset securities, may make it difficult for a broker-dealer to evidence the existence of digital asset securities for the purposes of the broker-dealer’s regulatory books, records, and financial statements, including supporting schedules. The broker-dealer’s difficulties in evidencing the existence of these digital asset securities may in turn create challenges for the broker-dealer’s independent auditor seeking to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence when testing management’s assertions in the financial statements during the annual broker-dealer audit.23 We understand that some firms are considering the use of distributed ledger technology with features designed to enable firms to meet recordkeeping obligations and facilitate prompt verification of digital asset security positions (e.g., regulatory nodes or permissioned distributed ledger technologies). Broker-dealers should consider how the nature of the technology may impact their ability to comply with the broker-dealer recordkeeping and reporting rules. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 Overview Generally, a broker-dealer that fails and is unable to return the customer property that it holds would be liquidated in accordance with SIPA. Under SIPA, securities customers have a first priority claim to cash and securities held by the firm for securities customers. Customers also are eligible for up to $500,000 in protection (of which up to $250,000 can be used for cash claims) if the broker-dealer is missing customer assets. These SIPA protections apply to a “security” as defined in SIPA and cash deposited with the broker-dealer for the purpose of purchasing securities.24 They do not apply to other types of assets, including, importantly, assets that are securities under the federal securities laws but are excluded from the definition of “security” under SIPA.25 Considerations for Digital Asset Securities In the case of a digital asset security that does not meet the definition of “security” under SIPA, and in the event of the failure of a carrying broker-dealer, SIPA protection likely would not apply and holders of those digital asset securities would have only unsecured general creditor claims against the broker-dealer’s estate.26 Further, uncertainty regarding when and whether a broker-dealer holds a digital asset security in its possession or control creates greater risk for customers that their securities will not be able to be returned in the event of a broker-dealer failure.27 The Staffs believe that such potential outcomes are likely to be inconsistent with the expectations of persons who would use a broker-dealer to custody their digital asset securities. Control Location Applications As a related matter, the Staffs have received inquiries from broker-dealers, including ATSs, wishing to utilize an issuer or transfer agent as a proposed “control location” for purposes of the possession or control requirements under the Customer Protection Rule. As described to the Staffs, this would involve uncertificated securities where the issuer or a transfer agent maintains a traditional single master security holder list, but also publishes as a courtesy the ownership record using distributed ledger technology. While the issuer or transfer agent may publish the distributed ledger, in these examples, the broker-dealers have asserted that the distributed ledger is not the authoritative record of share ownership. To the extent a broker-dealer contemplates an arrangement of this type, the Division will consider whether the issuer or the transfer agent can be considered a satisfactory control location pursuant to an application under paragraph (c)(7) of Rule 15c3-3.28 As noted, the Staffs encourage and support innovation in the securities markets and look forward to continuing to engage with investors and industry participants as the marketplace for digital asset securities develops. To contact Commission staff for assistance, please visit the Commission’s FinHub webpage or contact Thomas K. McGowan, Associate Director, at (202) 551-5521 or Raymond Lombardo, Assistant Director, at (202) 551-5755. To contact FINRA staff for assistance, please visit FINRA’s FinTech webpage or contact Kosha Dalal, Associate Vice President and Associate General Counsel, FINRA, (202) 728-6903. 1 For the purposes of this statement, the term “digital asset” refers to an asset that is issued and transferred using distributed ledger or blockchain technology, including, but not limited to, so-called “virtual currencies,” “coins,” and “tokens.” A digital asset may or may not meet the definition of a “security” under the federal securities laws. For the purposes of this statement, a digital asset that is a security is referred to as a “digital asset security.” 2 This statement represents staff views of the Division of Trading and Markets and FINRA. This statement is not a rule, regulation, guidance, or statement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) or FINRA, and the Commission and FINRA’s Board have neither approved nor disapproved its content. This statement does not alter or amend applicable law and has no legal force or effect. 3 For purposes of this statement, the Staffs use the term “entities” to refer to both firms and individuals. 4 The financial responsibility rules include Rule 15c3-1 (the net capital rule), Rule 15c3-3 (the customer protection rule), Rule 17a-3 (the record making rule), Rule 17a-4 (the record retention rule), Rule 17a-5 (the financial reporting rule), and Rule 17a-13 (the quarterly securities count rule) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). This statement does not address all federal securities laws that may be implicated by a broker-dealer seeking to maintain custody of digital asset securities. Further, this statement does not address other securities laws or rules that may apply to digital asset securities. 5 Rule 15c3-3 was adopted by the Commission in 1972. See Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 25224 (Nov. 29, 1972). 6 For example, one blockchain forensic analysis firm estimated that approximately $1.7 billion worth of bitcoin and other digital assets had been stolen in 2018, of which approximately $950 million resulted from cyberattacks on bitcoin trading platforms. The estimate of total losses in 2018 is 3.6 times higher than the estimate of such losses in 2017. See CipherTrace, Cryptocurrency Anti-Money Laundering Report, 2018 Q4, at 3 (Jan. 2019) (available at: https://ciphertrace.com/crypto-aml-report-2018q4/). 7 Firms can discuss with FINRA whether a contemplated change in business operations such as engaging in digital asset securities activities may require the filing of a CMA through the materiality consultation process. 8 These business models and transactions must comply with other provisions of the securities laws or regulations. The Staffs offer no views about whether such business models would be in compliance with other securities laws or regulations. 9 Entities that perform functions to facilitate the clearance and settlement of transactions in digital asset securities may be required to register as a clearing agency under Section 17A of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. 78q-1. 10 See, e.g., Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading, Division of Corporation Finance, Division of Investment Management, and Division of Trading and Markets, Commission (Nov. 16, 2018) (available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securites-issuuance-and-trading); see also e.g., Engaging on Non-DVP Custodial Practices and Digital Assets, letter issued by staff, Division of Investment Management, Commission, dated Mar. 12, 2019 (available at: https://www.sec.gov/investment/engaging-non-dvp-custodial-practices-and-digital-assets). 11 See Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 70072 (July 30, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 51824, 51826 (Aug. 21, 2013). In addition, if the broker-dealer is liquidated in a formal proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”), the securities and cash held by the broker-dealer for its customers would be isolated and readily identifiable as “customer property” and, consequently, available to be distributed to customers ahead of other creditors. Id. 12 See 15 U.S.C. 78fff-1 (setting forth the powers and duties of a SIPA trustee). 13 See paragraphs (b) and (c) of Rule 15c3-3. An entity’s designation as a good control location is based, in part, on its ability to maintain exclusive control over customer securities. See, e.g., paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 15c3-3 (deeming a “bank” as defined in Section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act to be a good control location so long as, among other things, the bank has acknowledged that customer securities “are not subject to any right, charge, security interest, lien or claim of any kind in favor of a bank or any person claiming through the bank” and the securities are in the custody or control of the bank). 14 See paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(5) of Rule 15c3-3. 15 The Commission often receives applications under paragraph (c)(7) of Rule 15c3-3 to designate an issuer or the transfer agent of various types of uncertificated securities as a control location. The Division has delegated authority to “find and designate as control locations for purposes of Rule 15c3-3(c)(7) [under the Exchange Act] certain broker-dealer accounts which are adequate for the protection of customer securities.” See 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(10)(i). The Commission has stated that mutual funds in particular may be held at the issuer or the issuer’s transfer agent. See, e.g., Broker-Dealer Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 70073 (July 30, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 51910, 51951 (Aug. 21, 2013) (stating that “[g]enerally, mutual funds issue securities only in book-entry form. This means that the ownership of securities is not reflected on a certificate that can be transferred but rather through a journal entry on the books of the issuer maintained by the issuer’s transfer agent. A broker-dealer that holds mutual funds for customers generally holds them in the broker-dealer’s name on the books of the mutual fund”). See also Form Custody for Broker-Dealers, 17 CFR 249.639 (providing broker-dealers with a field to indicate that they custody mutual fund securities with a transfer agent). The Division has also previously issued no-action letters regarding the maintenance of certain other uncertificated securities at the transfer agent. See, e.g., letter to Fantex Brokerage Services, LLC from Mark M. Attar, Senior Special Counsel, Division of Trading and Markets, Commission, dated Dec. 19, 2014 (providing that the staff would not recommend enforcement action if a broker-dealer treats a transfer agent for uncertificated securities as a good control location, under certain circumstances). These prior no-action letters do not address whether blockchain or distributed ledger technology, in connection with the maintenance of the single master security holder list, establishes control of uncertificated securities by the issuer (or transfer agent). 16 See, e.g., paragraph (d) of Rule 15c3-3 (requiring that, not later than the next business day, a broker-dealer, as of the close of the preceding business day, shall determine the quantity of fully paid securities and excess margin securities in its possession or control and the quantity of such securities not in its possession or control). 17 Cf. supra note 13. 18 See generally Rules 17a-3, 17a-4, and 17a-5. 19 See paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 17a-3. 20 See paragraph (a)(5) of Rule 17a-3. 21 See generally Rule 17a-5. 22 See paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of Rule 17a-5. 23 See generally PCAOB Auditing Standard 1105, Audit Evidence (describing sufficient appropriate audit evidence and stating that audit evidence consists of information that supports and corroborates management’s assertions regarding the financial statements and information that contradicts such assertions). 24 The SIPA definition of “security” is different than the federal securities laws definitions. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(14) (excluding from the SIPA definition of “security” an investment contract or interest that is not the subject of a registration statement with the Commission pursuant to the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933). This means there may be digital assets that are: (1) securities under the federal securities laws and SIPA, and thus are protected by SIPA; (2) securities under the federal securities laws, but not under SIPA, and thus not protected by SIPA; or (3) not securities under the federal securities laws and therefore not protected by SIPA. 25 If a broker-dealer holds securities that are not protected by SIPA, the broker-dealer must nevertheless comply with the physical possession or control requirements under Rule 15c3-3 with respect to those securities. 26 Generally, in a SIPA liquidation, assets not included in customer property (other than customer name securities) are liquidated and paid out to general creditors on a pro rata basis. See 15 U.S.C. 78fff-2(c); 15 U.S.C. 78fff(b). 27 See supra note 16. 28 See paragraph (c)(7) of Rule 15c3-3.
I’ve been researching privacy coins deeply and feel I’ve reached a sufficient findings to merit sharing my stance re SUMO.
By Taylor Margot. Everyone should read this! THE BASICS SUMOkoin is a fork of MONERO (XMR). XMR is a fork of Bytecoin. In my opinion, XMR is hands down the most undervalued coin in the top 15. Its hurdle is that people do not know how to price in privacy to the price of a coin yet. Once people figure out how to accurately assess the value privacy into the value of a coin, XMR, along with other privacy coins like SUMOkoin, will go parabolic. Let’s be clear about something. I am not here to argue SUMOkoin is superior to XMR. That’s not what this article is about and frankly is missing the point. I don’t find the SUMOkoin vs. XMR debate interesting. From where I stand, investing in SUMOkoin has nothing to do with SUMOkoin overtaking XMR or who has superior tech. If anything, I think the merits of XMR underline the value of SUMOkoin. What I do find interesting is return on investment (“ROI”). Imagine SUMO was an upcoming ICO. But you knew ahead of time that they had a proven product-market fit and an awesome, blue chip code base. That’s basically what you have in SUMO. Most good ICOs raise over 20mil (meaning their starting market cap is $20 mil) but after that, it’s a crapshoot. Investing in SUMO is akin to getting ICO prices but with the amount of information associated with more established coins. Let me make one more thing clear. Investing is all about information. Specifically it’s about the information imbalance between current value and the quality of your information. SUMO is highly imbalanced. The fact of the matter is that if you are interested in getting the vision and product/market fit of a $6 billion market cap coin for $20 mil, you should keep reading. If you are interested in arguing about XMR vs. SUMOkoin, I point you to this infographic Background I’m a corporate tech & IP lawyer in Silicon Valley. My practice focuses on venture capital (“VC)”) and mergers & acquisitions (“M&A”). Recently I have begun doing more IP strategy. Basically I spend all day every day reviewing cap tables, stock purchase agreements, merger agreements and patent portfolios. I’m also the CEO of a startup (Scry Chat) and have a team of three full-time engineers. I started using BTC in 2014 in conjunction with Silk Road and TOR. I recently had a minor conniption when I discovered how much BTC I handled in 2014. My 2017 has been good with IOTA at sub $0.30, POWR at $0.12, ENJIN at $0.02, REQ at $0.05, ENIGMA at $0.50, ITC (IoT Chain) and SUMO. My crypto investing philosophy is based on betting long odds. In the words of Warren Buffet, consolidate to get rich, diversify to stay rich. Or as I like to say, nobody ever got rich diversifying. That being said I STRONGLY recommend you have an IRA and/or 401(k) in place prior to venturing into crypto. But when it comes to crypto, I’d rather strike out dozens of times to have a chance at hitting a 100x home run. This approach is probably born out of working with VCs in Silicon Valley who do the same only with companies, not coins. I view myself as an aggressive VC in the cryptosphere. The Number 1 thing I’ve taken away from venture law is that it pays to get in EARLY. Did you know that the typical founder buys their shares for $0.00001 per share? So if a founder owns 5 million shares, they bought those shares for $50 total. The typical IPO goes out the door at $10-20 per share. My iPhone calculator says ERROR when it tries to divide $10/0.00001 because it runs out of screen real estate. At the time of this writing, SUMO has a Marketcap of $18 million. That is 3/10,000th or 1/3333th. Let that sink in for a minute. BCH is a fork of BTC and it has the fourth largest market cap of all cryptos. Given it’s market cap, I am positive SUMO is the best value proposition in the Privacy Coin arena at the time of this writing. * ROI MERITS OF SUMOkoin So what’s so good about SUMOkoin? Didn’t you say it was just a Monero knock-off? 1) Well, sort of. SUMO is based on CryptoNote and was conceived from a fork of Monero, with a little bit of extra privacy thrown in. It would not be wrong to think SUMO is to Litecoin as XMR is to Bitcoin. 2) Increased Privacy. Which brings us to point 2. SUMO is doing several things to increase privacy (see below). If Monero is the King of Privacy Coins, then SUMO is the Standard Bearer fighting on the front lines. Note: Monero does many of these too (though at the time of fork XMR could not). Don’t forget Monero is also 5.8 billion market cap to SUMO’s 18 million. a) RingCT. All transactions since genesis are RingCT (ring confidential transactions) and the minimum “mixin” transactions is 13 (12 plus the original transaction). This passes the threshold to statistically resist blockchain attacks. No transactions made on the SUMO blockchain can ever be traced to the actual participants. Nifty huh? Monero (3+1 mixins) is considering a community-wide fork to increase their minimum transactions to 6, 9, or 12. Not a bad market signal if you’re SUMOkoin eh? b) Sub-addresses. The wallet deploys disposable sub-addresses to conceal your real sumo wallet address even from senders (who typically would need to know your actual address to send currency). Monero also does this. 3) Fungibility aka “Digital Cash” aka Broad Use Case. “Fungibility” gets thrown about a bunch but basically it means ‘how close is this coin to cash in terms of usage?’ SUMO is one of a few cryptos that can boast true fungibility — it acts just like physical cash i.e. other people can never trace where the money came from or how many coins were transferred. MONERO will never be able to boast this because it did not start as fungible. 4) Mining Made Easy Mode. Seeing as SUMO was a fork, and not an ICO, they didn’t have to rewrite the wheel. Instead they focused on product by putting together solid fundamentals like a great wallet and a dedicated mining app. Basically anyone can mine with the most intuitive GUI mining app out there. Google “Sumo Easy Miner” – run and mine. 5) Intuitive and Secure Wallet. This shouldn’t come as a surprise, yet in this day and age, apparently it is not a prereq. They have a GUI wallet plus those unlimited sub-addresses I mentioned above. Here’s the github if you’d like to review: https://github.com/sumoprojects/SumoGUIWallet The wallet really is one of the best I have seen (ENJIN’s will be better). Clear, intuitive, idiot proof (as possible). 6) Decentralization. SUMO is botnet-proof, and therefore botnet mining resistant. When a botnet joins a mining pool, it adjusts the mining difficulty, thereby balancing the difficulty level of mining. 7) Coin Emission Scheme. SUMO’s block reward changes every 6-months as the following “Camel” distribution schema (inspired by real-world mining production like of crude oil, coal, etc. that is often slow at first, then accelerated in before decline and depletion). MONERO lacks this schema and it is significant. Camel ensures that Sumokoin won’t be a short-lived phenomena. Specifically, since Sumo is proof-of-work, not all SUMO can be mined. If it were all mined, miners would no longer be properly incentivized to contribute to the network (unless transaction fees were raised, which is how Bitcoin plans on handling when all 21 million coins have been mined, which will go poorly given that people already complain about fees). A good emission scheme is vital to viability. Compare Camel and Monero’s scheme if you must: https://github.com/sumoprojects/sumokoin/blob/mastescripts/sumokoin_camel_emission_cal.cpp vs. https://monero.stackexchange.com/questions/242/how-was-the-monero-emission-curve-chosen/247. 8) Dev Team // Locked Coins // Future Development Funds. There are lots of things that make this coin a ‘go.’ but perhaps the most overlooked in crypto is that the devs have delivered ahead of schedule. If you’re an engineer or have managed CS projects, you know how difficult hitting projected deadlines can be. These guys update github very frequently and there is a high degree of visibility. The devs have also time-locked their pre-mine in a publicly view-able wallet for years so they aren’t bailing out with a pump and dump. The dev team is based in Japan. 9) Broad Appeal. If marketed properly, SUMO has the ability to appeal to older individuals venturing into crypto due to the fungibility / similarities to cash. This is not different than XMR, and I expect it will be exploited in 2018 by all privacy coins. It could breed familiarity with new money, and new money is the future of crypto. 10) Absent from Major Exchanges. Thank god. ALL of my best investments have happened off Binance, Bittrex, Polo, GDAX, etc. Why? Because by the time a coin hits a major exchange you’re already too late. Your TOI is fucked. You’re no longer a savant. SUMO is on Cryptopia, the best jenky exchange. 11) Marketing. Which brings me to my final point – and it happens to be a weakness. SUMO has not focused on marketing. They’ve instead gathered together tech speaks for itself (or rather doesn’t). So what SUMO needs a community effort to distribute facts about SUMO’s value prop to the masses. A good example is Vert Coin. Their team is very good at disseminating information. I’m not talking about hyping a coin; I’m talking about how effectively can you spread facts about your product to the masses. To get mainstream SUMO needs something like this VertCoin post: https://np.reddit.com/vertcoin/comments/7ixkbf/vertbase_a_vertcoin_to_usd_exchange/ MARKET CAP DISCUSSION For a coin with using Monero’s tech, 20 million is minuscule. For any coin 20 mil is nothing. Some MC comparisons [as of Jan 2, 2017]:
SUMO: 18 million
ENJIN: 150 million (9x)
Enigma: 465 million (26x)
REQ: 500 million (28x)
POWR: 500 million (28x)
Monero: 5.8 billion (mental maths iz hard)
Let’s talk about market cap (“MC”) for a minute. It gets tossed around a lot but I don’t think people appreciate how important getting in as early as possible can be. Say you buy $1000 of SUMO at 20 mil MC. Things go well and 40 million new money gets poured into SUMO. Now the MC = 60 million. Your ROI is 200% (you invested $1,000 and now you have 3,000, netting 2,000). Now let’s says say you bought at 40 million instead of 20 million. $20 mill gets poured in until the MC again reaches 60 mil. Your ROI is 50% (you put in $1,000, you now have 1,500, netting 500). Remember: investing at 20 mil MC vs. 40 mil MC represents an EXTREMELY subtle shift in time of investment (“TOI”). But the difference in net profit is dramatic. the biggest factor is that your ROI multiplier is locked in at your TOI — look at the difference in the above example. 200% ROI vs. 50% ROI. That’s huge. But the difference was only 20 mil — that’s 12 hours in the crypto world. I strongly believe SUMO can and will 25x in Q1 2018 (400m MC) and 50x by Q4 2018 reach. There is ample room for a tricked out Monero clone at 1 bil MC. That’s 50x. Guess how many coins have 500 mil market caps? 58 as of this writing. 58! Have many of these coins with about ~500 mil MC have you heard of? MaidSafeCoin? Status? Decred? Veritaseum? DRAGONCHAIN ARE YOU KIDDING ME THE ROLE OF PRIVACY I want to close with a brief discussion of privacy as it relates to fundamental rights and as to crypto. 2018 will be remembered as the Year of Privacy Coins. Privacy has always been at the core of crypto. This is no coincidence. “Privacy” is the word we have attached to the concept of possessing the freedom to do as you please within the law without explaining yourself to the government or financial institution. Discussing privacy from a financial perspective is difficult because it has very deep political significance. But that is precisely why it is so valuable. Privacy is the right of billions of people not to be surveilled. We live in a world where every single transaction you do through the majority financial system is recorded, analyzed and sold — and yet where the money goes is completely opaque. Our transactions are visible from the top, but we can’t see up. Privacy coins turn that upside down. Privacy is a human right. It is the guarantor of American constitutional freedom. It is the cornerstone of freedoms of expression, association, political speech and all our other freedoms for that matter. And privacy coins are at the root of that freedom. What the internet did for freedom of information, privacy coins will do for freedom of financial transactions. POST SCRIPT: AN ENGINEER’S PERSPECTIVE Recently a well respected engineer reached out to me and had this to say about SUMO. I thought I’d share. "I’m messaging you because I came at this from a different perspective. For reference, I started investing in Sumo back when it was around $0.5 per coin. My background is in CS and Computer Engineering. I currently research in CS. When I was looking for a coin to invest in, I approached it in a completely different way from what you described in your post, I first made a list of coins with market caps < 20m, and then I removed all the coins that didn’t have active communities. Next, because of my background, I read through the code for each of the remaining coins, and picked the coins which had both frequent commits to GitHub (proving dev activity), and while more subjective, code that was well written. Sumo had both active devs, and (very) well written code. I could tell that the people behind this knew what they were doing, and so I invested. I say all of this, because I find it interesting how we seem to have very different strategies for selecting ‘winners’ but yet we both ended up finding Sumo." — Legal Disclaimer: THIS POST AND ANY SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS BY THE AUTHOR DO NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL OR FINANCIAL ADVICE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO BE LEGAL OR FINANCIAL ADVICE OR RELIED UPON. NO REFERENCES TO THIS POST SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS LEGAL OR FINANCIAL ADVICE. THIS POST REPRESENTS THE LONE OPINION OF A NON-SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR.
Note: Previously the Evolution Whitepapers were linked in this section. These papers were written back in 2015 and are outdated, because Dash Evolution has seen a massive re-design and has been developed much further than those papers could have predicted. A new version will be posted here and elsewhere as soon as it is available.
"Dash rebranded from Darkcoin to distance itself from its dark history!!" -> Not at all. Nothing about its history is "dark" and more importantly this thread called "The Birth of Darkcoin" is stickied by Evan Duffield himself on the official main forum.
Why saying "Dash is a company" is false: Dash Core Inc., a company based in Scottsdale, Arizona is not the decentralized network called Dash. The network, consistent of over 4.5k globally distributed, decentralized Masternodes decided to hire and fund the company Dash Core Inc. to develop said network. This is the distinguishing property of Dash being a DAO, so it's understandable people have difficulty grasping the concept. Similarly Dash does not have a CEO, while Dash Core Inc. -obviously- has.
Dash does not and never had a "dev tax": Dash has a Treasury and its distribution is being voted on each month. Only those funds that have been approved by the Masternode network go to proposal owners. The Treasury is capped at 10% of the accumulated block reward of one month. There is no central authority non-requested or non-approved funds go to and there never has been. Those funds are simply not created. So you can have months in which only 8% of the budget is being paid out, with the remaining 2% going to nobody due to not being mined.
"B-but Evan Duffield can roll back the last 24 hours of the blockchain with the flick of a button!" Complete bullshit. The key in question refers to requiring a Masternode to re-validate its pre-existing blockchain in order to ensure it's on the right chain. Masternodes have nothing do with putting or removing transactions into or from the blockchain, only the miners can do that, thus claiming someone can "roll back the blockchain" in Dash is a malicious lie and a desperate attempt to make Dash look centralized when it's not. In short: No such button exists, ever existed or will ever exist.
The Dash community is well aware that during most of its history this project has been under attack by competitors, many of which are trying to portray Dash (among many other things) as a failure. This is oxymoronic, because nobody hates on failures, especially not for 4 successful years in a row. If you want a quick history lesson, here's a comment I made on where the Dash hate originated from back in 2014 Another, longer history lesson Remain skeptical towards sensational accusations without evidence. Our community is helpful, knowledgeable and more than happy to answer any questions, as we have done many times on this subreddit. Still, we're all only human, have limited resources and we're just one project among many (always among the top, though!). Stakeholders and investors of other projects will always have an agenda to smear what they perceive as competition (I have yet to see our community actively go after other projects, though). Just remember the Bullshit Asymmetry: "The amount of energy required to refute bullshit is at least an order of magnitude larger than to produce it." So it would be very unjust to expect a refutation on the spot all of the time. Prefer taking the initiative by asking the community directly about the claim you're confronted with. This community has proven many times to possess the integrity required to admit to technological shortcomings, but at the same time we'll never hesitate to call out illegitimate claims and accusations, of which there are many, for what they are. The most common and most empty attack is "Dash is a scam".
Dash has surpassed its all-time high price several times
Its developers are publicly known, many by full name
It's still being developed after almost 4 years with an incredible track record of under-promising and over-delivering, a game-changing roadmap & a clear vision of the future
Its technology works as advertised and remains objectively superior to Bitcoin and many other currencies
Myriads of projects copied Dash's features
Look at the wealth of in-depth information linked on this page alone. Look at all the interviews, articles, news shows, podcasts, presentations, conferences, infrastructure, the people and all the money invested into all of this: Does this all really look like a grandiose scam? Why the effort?
More importantly you have to ask the critic just this one question: Who was scammed? The answer usually consists of complete silence or attempts to change the topic. This may sound all very defensive to someone who has never experienced the kind of FUD Dash has faced over the years, but the falsehoods we've refuted above are still being perpetuated by a very lonely but also very loud minority.
Not an ICO project
Regarding Dash's finances: Despite what many people assume influenced by the ICO insanity of the recent past, Dash did not have an ICO and Dash does not depend on 3rd party funding/investors. It is self funded from the blockchain and thus an entirely independent organization that does exactly what it wants, not what any angel investors want us to do. Dash is the first currency in history to achieve that.
Quick incomplete rundown of Dash's features
In fact Dash pioneered almost every single one of its features making it one of the most prolific innovators in the cryptocurrency space. Before Dash invented them, none of these features existed:
X11: power saving hashing algorithm
Dark Gravity Wave: highly reliable difficulty adjustment
Sporks: Multi-phased forking technology avoiding hard forks during network upgrades
Masternodes: Incentivized full node infrastructure through split of mining reward
PrivateSend: protocol level coin mixing without the flaws of CoinJoin
Treasury: Self-funding by splitting of block reward
Blockchain Governance: Voting rights for those who provide our network's backbone
Evolution platform technology: Under heavy development but making rapid progress towards true digital cash so user-friendly that even your grandmother could use it
To re-iterate a previous point: Dash has been copied by several dozen other projects either completely or through selected features indicating a strong approval of its technology within the wider cryptocurrency industry. The most copied feature by far is the Masternode system and the financial self-reliance it provides.
Abstract The term Nakamoto consensus is generally used to refer to Bitcoin's novel consensus mechanism, by which agreement on its underlying transaction ledger is reached. It is argued that this agreement protocol represents the core innovation behind Bitcoin, because it promises to facilitate the decentralization of trusted third parties. Specifically, Nakamoto consensus seeks to enable mutually distrusting entities with weak pseudonymous identities to reach eventual agreement while the set of participants may change over time. When the Bitcoin white paper was published in late 2008, it lacked a formal analysis of the protocol and the guarantees it claimed to provide. It would take the scientific community several years before first steps towards such a formalization of the Bitcoin protocol and Nakamoto consensus were presented. However, since then the number of works addressing this topic has grown substantially, providing many new and valuable insights. 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What is FLO? FLO is a cryptocurrency that introduces a worldwide public record for storing information. FLO coins are needed to pay for storage capacity, and coins are issued to reward participants for their work to secure and distribute information. FLO is used to send payments and store data. This encourages building applications because anyone has the ability to write data into FLO. How does FLO work? FLO is a network similar to bitcoin where the open ledger is secured by miners competing to find proof-of-work. FLO has its own ledger, called the FLO blockchain, that can be thought of as a digital public space for storing information.
40 second block generation allows for fast confirmations, but not too fast to cause problems with network synchronisation.
No pre-mine, super-blocks or zero-blocks at the start.
Quick difficulty adjustment should limit insta-mining in the first hours after launch.
A floData can be added to any coin transaction. This can be used to attach a simple message or reference to a transaction, or for any other purpose decided by the coin receiver and sender. floData is currently limited to 1040 characters. Both the GUI and RPC interface have been extended to implement this feature.* The floData field can be seen under the "Transactions" tab when you double click on a a transaction ("Transaction information"). Also available from the terminal by doing "listtransactions".
Note that floData is stored in the block-chain and are therefore public. If you want to send private information in your floData you should encrypt the message using a method agreed upon by the sender and receiver.
floData has minimal impact on the size of the block chain due to small size (relative to the size of a block in the chain) and the fact that it does not take up any extra space when not used in a transaction. Transaction costs (calculated on transaction size) also offset the impact of slightly larger transactions when floData is included.
Block target spacing: 40 seconds Difficulty retargets every blocks Block reward: 100 FLO, halving every 800,000 blocks (about 1 year) Maximum coins: 160 million FLONetwork port: 7312RPC port: 7313
TL:DR: Don't bother mining if you want to get rich yo. You're way too late to the party. Welcome to the exciting and often stressful world of bitcoin! You are wondering what looks like a once in a lifetime opportunity to get rich quick. Of course you guys probably heard about this "mining" process but what is this? Simply put, a bitcoin mining machine that performs complicated calculations and when deemed correct by the network, receives a block which contains 25 bitcoins (XBT). This is how bitcoins are generated. So your brain instantly thinks, "Holy shit, how can I get on this gold rush?" Before you proceed further, I would like to explain the concept of mining further. Bitcoin is limited 21m in circulation. It is coded to release a certain number of blocks at a certain time frame, ie: this year the network will release close to 500,000 bitcoins. What this means is that the more people (or specifically the amount of mining power) mine, the less each person gets. The network tries to keep to this time frame through the process of difficulty adjustments which makes the calculations harder and this happens every 2 weeks. So every 2 weeks, you get less bitcoins with the same hash rate (mining power) based on what the difficulty changes are. Recently, the changes have been pretty staggering, jumping 226% in 2 months. You can see the difficulty changes here. Now, why are these changes so large? A bit of a simple history. Bitcoin's algorithm runs on SHA-256. This algorithm can be solved using many hardware, from CPU to GPU and dedicated hardware (Application Specific Integrated Circuits). When bitcoin first started, mining on CPU was a trivial process, you can pretty much earn 50 XBT (the block size then) every few hours between Q1 and Q2 of 2010. In late 2010, due to the difficulty increase that is reducing the effectiveness of CPU mining, people started to harness GPU mining. Only AMD GPU's architecture design are better optimized for bitcoin mining so this is what the community used. Immediate improvements of more than 10x was not uncommon. In time of course, GPUs reached their limit and people started to build dedicated. In the same vein as the CPU to GPU transition, similar performance increase was common. These ASICs can only perform SHA-256 calculation so they can be highly optimized. Their performance mainly depends on the die size of the chips exactly like CPU chips. In general, think of bitcoin mining's technological advancement no different to mining gold. Gold panning (CPUs) vs pickaxes (GPUs) vs machinery (ASICs) and we are still in the ASIC mining race. ASIC mining started with ASICMiner and Avalon being first to the market, both producing 130nm and 110nm chips. The technology are antiquated in comparison to CPUs and GPUs which are now 22nm with 14nm slated for Q1 next year by Intel but they are cheap to manufacture and with performance gains similar to the CPU to GPU transition, they were highly successful and popular for early adopters. At that point in time since there were less competing manufacturers and the low batch runs of their products, miners became really rich due to the slow increase in difficulty. The good days came to an end mid August with an unprecedented 35% increase in difficulty. This is due to existing manufacturers selling more hardware and many other players coming onto the market with better hardware (smaller die). Since die shrinking knowledge and manufacturing process are well known along with a large technological gap (110nm vs 22nm), you get an arms race. Current ASIC makers are closing in on our technological limit and until everyone catches up, the difficulty jumps will be high because it is just too easy to get a performance increase. Most newer products run at 28nm and most chips are not well optimized, so it will be around another 6 to 9 months before we see hit a hard plateau with 22nm or 14nm chips. The estimated time frame is because manufacturing chips at 22nm or 14nm is a more difficult and expensive task. In the meantime most manufacturers will probably settle at 28nm and we will reach a soft plateau in about 3 months. Now, you might ask these questions and should have them answered and if you have not thought about them at all, then you probably should not touch bitcoin until you understand cause you are highly unprepared and probably lose lots of money.
I read that you can mine with a CPU/GPU, should I do so?
No. If you have to ask, please do not touch bitcoin yet. You will spend more on electricity cost than mining any substantial bitcoin. Seriously. At all. A 7990 would produce a pitiful 0.02879 XBT (USD $14 @ $500/XBT exchange rate) for the next 30 days starting 23 Nov 2013 at 35% difficulty increase. And if you think you can mine on your laptop either on a CPU or GPU, you are probably going to melt it before you even get 0.01 XBT.
I get free electricity and I have existing hardware, should I still mine?
Probably not because you probably forgot that GPUs and CPUs produce a ton of heat and noise. You can try but I see no point earning < $20 bucks per month.
Should I buy an ASIC machine?
No, because your machine will probably not mine as much as buying bitcoins. This situation is called the opportunity cost. While you can still make money if XBT rise in value, it is a fallacy.
IE: if you start mining on 1 Dec 2013, a KnC Jupiter running at 450Gh/sec (KnC lies as not all chips run at 550Gh/sec) will yield you a total revenue of 9.5189 XBT with a profit of 0.7859 XBT in profit by 30th Jan 2014 at a constant difficulty increase of 35%. The opportunity cost is: 8.5910 XBT @ USD $580/XBT with USD $5,000 which is the cost of a KnC Jupiter. This is the best you can earn and it's a bloody optimistic assumption because:
You are assuming your pre-order will arrive on time. (I do not think any first batch pre-order from any manufacturer has arrived on time).
All pre-orders are sold out for 1 Dec.
You are assuming your chips will run at 450Gh/sec minimum but many miners here will tell you their chips have been under performing.
Electricity cost have not been taken into account.
Shipping cost and time has not been taking into account.
Import Tax or VAT has not been taken into account.
Risk of downtime due to DOA or warranties has not been taken into account.
You are assuming the difficulty increase will be a constant 35% which is very unlikely because Cointerra with a team that has worked on some of the world’s highest performance CPUs, GPUs and chipsets for NVIDIA, Intel, Samsung, Qualcomm and Nortel has pre-sold an absurd amount of hash rate. Difficulty increase of 45% or more (which we have seen when a small player, KnC shipped their 1st batch) will be repeated commonly. This is only 1 company, imagine what the rest will come out with. I have failed repeatedly and so have many in estimating future hashrate. You wont be able to do better.
Even if you earn some profit, it will be < 15% and will probably be not worth your risk or your trouble. I can buy and hold XBT with no risk of losing them.
The only circumstances where you will earn money is when XBT exchange rates is so high that it makes the opportunity cost pales in comparison. Unfortunately this is not the case. If XBT stabilized at 900/XBT today (20 Nov 2013) then we might have a good case. The risk is just generally not worth it. Unless you have at least a hundred thousand and can make a contract with a manufacturer for a lower cost, do not bother. Just wait until the arms race is over then you can start mining.
I understand I probably won't earn any money, I just want to do this for fun/hobby...
Okay, go buy an AsicMiner USB Block Erupter. They are cheap and pretty fun to have.
I want something with more omph and still do not mind losing money
Sure, just read the answer below on who NOT to go for. You are doing bitcoin a service by securing the network and you have our (the users') gratitude.
Who are the manufacturers?
You can check out the manufacturers and their products below along with a calculator here. If you still insist on buying, do not to go for BFL. Their track record is horrid and borderline scammish. KnC fucked up a lot with defective boards and chips. Personally, I think CoinTerra is the best choice. Alternatively, you can go on the secondary market to buy a delivered product. You can get a better deal there if you know how to do your "return on investment (ROI)" calculation. Personally, I will go for a 45%-50% difficulty increase for the next 3 months for my calculations and a 2% pool fee. However, most products on ebay are sold at a cost much higher than it should. bitcointalk.org is a cheaper place because everyone knows what are the true value is so you will find less options. If you are unclear or need assistance, please post a question.
Which pool should I use?
I actually do not use any of the pools recommended to the left because I think they lack features. My favourite is Bitminter (Variable fees based on features used; max 2%). It has all advanced features for a pool, very responsive and helpful owner on IRC. Variable fees is good for those who do not need a large feature set, even with all features turned on, it is still cheap. Eligius (0% fees) has high value for money but lacks features. It has anonymous mining which might be attractive to certain subset of people but not for others. Many other community member and I disagree highly with the opinions of the owner on the direction of bitcoin. I do use his pool for now but I do so only because I share my miners with a few partners and anonymous mining allows us to monitor the machines without using an account. Bitminter uses only OpenID which is problematic for me. BTC Guild (3% fees) is another big pool and is fully featured and does charge a premium for their fees. That said, they are the most stable of the lot. I do use them but do so only because my hoster uses them for monitoring. I try not to use them because a pool with a very large hash rate (they are the largest) presents a large vulnerability to bitcoin's network if compromised. All of them pay out transaction fees.
BetMoose is a global betting exchange where you earn money by predicting real life future events and outcomes. Use bitcoin to bet anonymously. Jan. 28, 2014, 4:53 p.m. btc-e has been disabled on Bitcoin Charts until problems with accessing their API has been resolved. Kraken added. Jan. 8, 2014, 7:52 p.m. We've just added Kraken to bitcoincharts. btc-e USD restored. Jan. 4, 2014, 10:45 a.m. As of today btc-e USD is back. Please keep in mind that the data feed from btce is still ... Bitcoin Difficulty Increase. Difficulty on the bitcoin network is a measure of how problematic it is to find a hash below a given target. Valid blocks must have a hash below the global block difficulty target. There is also a share difficulty which applies to mining pools and their ability to find a hash that is lower than the global target. But Williams sees the broader market wising up to Bitcoin’s limitations and taking back control in 2014. Bitcoin is not a stock, a bond or even a legal entity. No board or directors oversees it. Bitcoin difficulty is also expected to undergo an imminent increase of 8% or so this week if it hasn’t already (charts are lagging a day or so). LongHash has been looking into the trends to see if there is any correlation between these metrics and bitcoin prices.
The Impact of the Bitcoin - https://www.bitcoin.com The rise of the bitcoin as a virtual currency is prompting both excitement and concerns around the world. This program examines the 2 sides of ... For more info regarding bitcoin paper wallet, please visit web site below: http://www.cryptocoinwalletcards.com/ Tags: asic bitcoin miner, asic bitcoin miner... #Mining #BitCoin #Cryptocurrency Welcome to the 13th episode of CCMDL , January 27 2020 We go over talk a little about the difficulty of Ethereum , Bitcoin, Monero & LiteCoins difficulty for ... Bitcoins Wallet wird man auf einen Handy nicht so leicht benutzten können mit 30 oder 40 GB Blockchain ;)/ oder wie soll das gehen? Auch hab ich keine Lust auf Dauer auf meinen PC 40GB dazu zu ... http://bitcoinpoet.com Bitcoin is a software-based payment system described by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 and introduced as open-source software in 2009. Payme...